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Abstract 
 
In this paper the impact of various types of state aid on aggregate productivity growth in Belarusian manufacturing 
is investigated  by  combining the data on government support with firm-level accounting data for period 1998-2007. 
Obtained results indicate that the state aid provided for restructuring truly leads to the modernization of the enterprises 
(capital-to-labor ratio grows), that this modernization leads to an increase in effectiveness (TFP grows, especially at large 
enterprises), and that this growth  of TFP allows the newly restructured enterprises to raise their market share which results 
in the growth of the allocative efficiency.  However, when the state aid is provided to support enterprises in financial distress, 
while it leads to an increase in employment (only for enterprises receiving aid, especially for large enterprises, but not for the 
total sample) and to an expansion in the market share of large enterprises (not small and medium size), this achievement 
comes at the expense of the decrease in TFP.  
 
JEL Classification: C21, L2, L53, O47, P31.  
Keywords: state aid, total factor productivity , allocative efficiency,  Arellano-Bond method.  
                            
* Acknowledgements:  
The author would like to thank Tom Coupe, James Leitzel, Irina Murtazashvili,  David Brown, Shlomo Weber, Vladimir Popov and other 
participants of EERC workshops in Kiev for their helpful suggestions.  I would like to say individual thanks to Michael Alexeev for his 
excellent expertise and comments that substantially improved this paper. The author is  grateful for financial support from the  
Economics Education and Research Consortium with funds  provided by the Global Development Network and the  Government of 
Sweden   (grant No. R08-0731).  
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the paper are those of the  author and should not be attributed to any organization the author is or 
have been affiliated with. 
 
† Institute of Economics of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus,220072, Surganova st. 1/2, Minsk, 
Belarus. E-mail: kolesnikovai@tut.by 
 
 
 
 2
 
Contents 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 3 
1.1. Policy Context of the Study ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 3 
1.2.  Statement of the Research Problem ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 5 
3. MODEL AND ESTIMATION ........................................................................................... 7 
3.1. Productivity Estimation .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 
3.2. Measuring Allocative Efficiency................................................................................................................................................................................................. 10 
3.3. Empirical Model .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 11 
4. DATA SOURCES AND DATASET ................................................................................. 16 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS ............................................................................................ 18 
5.1. Estimation Results for TFP ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 18 
5.2. Allocative Efficiency Estimation ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 20 
5.3. Impact of State Aid on  Enterprises’ Performance ........................................................................................................................................................... 21 
5.3.1.State Aid of First Type.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................22 
5.3.2. State Aid of Second Type ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................26 
5.3.3. Impact of State Aid on Capital/Labor Ratios..........................................................................................................................................................................28 
6. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................... 30 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................... 32 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 37 
 
 
 
 
     1. Introduction 
     1.1. Policy Context of the Study  
 
After deregulation of prices and dramatic changes in relative prices in the 1990s transition economies typically had only 
a limited share of firms that were competitive and could operate with profit. The rest of the firms were either doomed to fail 
or needed substantial restructuring.  However, shortage of investment resources impeded instantaneous economic 
restructuring. That is why the aim of providing state aid to industrial enterprises was twofold.  
 
Firstly, to absorb social shocks through maintaining employment at financially distressed enterprises. Supporting these 
enterprises for a limited period of time may be justified even if aid adversely affects resources allocation, provided that 
poorly performing enterprises (sectors) are eventually squeezed out.  
 
Secondly, aid was aimed at increasing the investment potential of viable enterprises, which are expected to become the 
agents of future economic growth.  In both cases state aid has externalities, which are rather difficult to measure directly. 
However, from economic point of view the second type of aid is justifiable  if it positively influence TFP and aggregate 
productivity growth in the long run. If productivity of the enterprises that receive state aid decreases, there is little chance 
that they can create positive externalities for development of other sectors of manufacturing and for the economy as a 
whole.  
 
Recent economic performance of Belarus was quite impressive (nearly 8%  annual average growth of GDP in 2000-08), 
some even call it a new “Slavic tiger”, so the question that naturally arises is to what extent, if any, this successful 
performance is due to the state assistance to enterprises. 
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1.2.  Statement of the Research Problem 
 
The objective of this paper is to study impact of various types of state aid on aggregate productivity growth in Belarusian 
manufacturing.  Aggregate productivity depends not only on average performance of enterprises, but also on the size of the 
market share held by efficiently performing enterprises. State aid may influence both components of the aggregate 
productivity: total factor productivity of a recipient enterprise, its market share and, hence, distribution of resources in the 
economy. To evaluate the impact of state aid on aggregate productivity, I use Olley and Pakes efficiency decomposition 
(1996) to measure  the allocative efficiency.         
There is of course  the endogeneity problem in measuring the impact of different types of state aid on aggregate productivity 
because a counterfactual is lacking and because of selection bias. The latter is conditioned by the fact that firms receiving 
aid may differ from firms not receiving aid along other parameters. To overcome the problem, I use the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) methods  that  are specially designed for analysis of unbalanced 
panel data which is characterized with small T(time period) and  large N (enterprises). 
 
The study will contribute to the literature on evaluating the effectiveness of state aid to industry focusing on the experience 
of Belarus. The majority of empirical studies dealing with evaluation of effectiveness of state aid have been conducted either 
based on the analysis of specific programs within the framework of the industrial policy (R&D subsidies, export subsidies, 
etc.) (Girma et al., 2006 a, b, Kesner-akreb et al., 2003, J. Foreman-Peck, 2007), or based on the analysis of the impact of 
the state aid on financially distressed enterprises (London Economics, 2004, H. Schweiger, 2006, etc.). In addition, actually 
all studies have been conducted using the data on the countries where either unambiguous legislative constraints on 
providing such kind of aid (developed countries, specifically EU countries) exist, or such constraints are being introduced 
(WTO or EU accession countries and also the countries which have recently joined these organizations). Belarus, like some 
other FSU countries, is actually not bound by international commitments of such kind and, therefore, state aid to  businesses 
is provided here at a large scale (within the time period in question – 1998-2005 – from 10 to 27% of industrial enterprises 
 
 
 5
enjoyed the state aid in some or other form). It is noteworthy that the state aid has been provided both to viable businesses 
to expand investment opportunities (Program of State Support to Manufacturers-Exporters, Program of Stimulating Industrial 
Production, Program of Support to Specific Industrial Sectors) and financially distressed enterprises (Program of Financial 
Restructuring) to prevent their bankruptcy and maintain employment. Therefore, the case of Belarus is of specific interest 
because it provides an opportunity to comprehensively evaluate the effect of the state aid on the resources allocation in the 
economy. The results obtained would allow assessing the efficiency of the economic policy pursued and formulation of 
proposals to adjust it. The latter is  extremely relevant at the time of the current financial crisis when the state has to support 
many enterprises: it is critical to indentify  the directions and  forms of  aid that will be the most effective. 
2. Literature Review 
 
There exists a relatively large body of literature that focuses on the general impact of government assistance to enterprises 
and the effectiveness of such assistance. A number of theoretical models comprehensively evaluating the effect of the state 
aid on the economic welfare has been recently developed (Collie, 2000, Everaert, 2003, Mariniello, M., 2006 etc.). The 
empirical studies, however, are, as a rule, of a narrower character and evaluate the effect of the state aid on performance of 
specific enterprises and sectors without dealing with its impact on the aggregate productivity growth. As a result, empirical 
studies, which define ‘effectiveness’ of state aid in a number of different ways, provide ambiguous evidence. Harris, 
Robinson (2004) and Gual, Jodar (2006) find some evidence that firms receiving aid are able to improve their productivity. 
Girma, Gong, Gorg and Yu (2006) using Chinese firm-level data conclude  that aid can foster export activity. In contrast, 
Bergstrom (2000) finds that firms which receive regional policy subsidies in Sweden are not able to boost their productivity. 
Similarly, Beason and Weinstein (1996) use industry-level data for evaluating the effect of assistance in Japan and no 
evidence of productivity enhancements as a result of the industrial policy measures is found.  Foreman-Peck (2007) shows 
that government aid for innovation in UK supports growth, but returns from this aid are far from covering spending.  
Using micro-level data, Wren and Storey(2002) and Girma et al. (2006 b) demonstrate that the receipt of financial 
assistance can improve the prospects of survival of the beneficiary firms.. However, a study conducted by London 
Economics (2004) to evaluate the impact of rescue and restructuring aid on international competitiveness reveals that most 
survivors remained well below average level of industry profitability.  State aid the firms receive provides soft budget 
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constraints, and soft budget constraints influence the life-cycle of firms and hence market selection, which, in its turn, affects 
aggregate productivity growth. 
 In compliance with this statement, Schweiger (2006) proves that state aid for rescue and restructuring hindered the efficient 
allocation of resources in Slovenian manufacturing.  None of the firms that received aid exited the market; aid had a positive 
impact on the growth of market shares, but did not have a significant impact on the growth of TFP.  
   
Inasmuch as the major portion of this study concerns the influence of policy and institutions on aggregate productivity 
growth, the referenced related literature would be useful. Aggregate productivity growth has been the topic of numerous 
studies, so our understanding of it and also its measurement have improved since Solow (1957).  There is an increasing 
body of evidence implying that healthy market economies demonstrate both static and dynamic allocative efficiency, 
therefore more productive businesses possess a larger market share and reallocation of outputs and inputs within sectors 
shifts resources from less to more productive businesses (e.g. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004), Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006), Olley and Pakes (1996)). In terms of accounting, reallocation significantly contributes to 
overall productivity. However, the coexistence in narrowly-defined industries of firms with extremely different productivity 
performance conforms with the idea of substantial frictions preventing resources from being immediately allocated to the 
highest valued use. Among other factors, such frictions can be related to policy and institutions affecting market competition 
and adjustment costs (see e.g. World Bank, Doing Business, 2006). While these issues are hardly resolved for advanced 
economies, they assume an even greater role in emerging and transition economies (Bartelsman, E. et. al., 2006). 
Caballero and Hammour (2000) argue that the function of institutions is two-fold, one of efficiency and one of redistribution, 
and both are critical for macroeconomic outcomes. A poor institutional environment leads to technological “sclerosis” since it 
allows low-productivity units to survive for a longer period than they would in an efficient equilibrium and hence causes 
stagnation in the process of creative destruction. Haltiwanger and Schweiger (2005) find that an unfavorable business 
climate has a negative impact on allocative efficiency.  
 
The above mentioned papers use quite broad measures of institutions, mostly at the country level. This study 
uses microlevel statistical data on the institute (state aid) characterized by potentially distortive effect, in 
particular, providing state aid for industrial enterprises.  
  7
 
3. Model and Estimation 
3.1. Productivity Estimation 
 
The problem of evaluation of TFP for specific firms has been extensively discussed in the economic literature (see 
Escribano and Guasch (2004), Arnold (2005) and Wooldridge (2005) for overview). Econometricians propose different 
estimation approaches:  residuals from estimated Cobb-Douglas or translog production function, using instrumental variable 
techniques or employing panel data estimation (fixed effect estimations); stochastic frontier or data envelopment analysis. 
All these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages and have been analyzed in great  detail in the literature. 
Even the currently most popular approach to the production function estimation proposed by Olley and Packes (1996) and 
extended by Levinsohn and Pertin (2003) has a number of limitations, since it requires a detailed sequential timing of the 
inputs decision which is not quite suitable for annual data. 
 
 It is obvious that choosing some or other approach to estimate TPF is based on the data available. Since comprehensive 
data neither on investment nor on intermediate input are available in the existing databases,  the most  simple way  is to 
estimate  TPF as residuals from an industry-specific Cobb-Douglas production function, which is,   nevertheless, used in 
many productivity growth works ( see, for example, Brown et al., 2006;  Tytell et al.,  2005). 
 
Linear   specification  of  Cobb-Douglas production function have the following form: 
       jitkjjitljjitjit KLTFPY ,,,, lnlnlnln αα ++=                                  (1) 
where 
i-  firm, t - time, j - 2-digit NACE1  industry 
jitY ,     - annual gross value of output in constant 1998 prices  
(deflated with PPP indices – specific for every enterprise) 
jitK ,     -  gross value of fixed capital stock in constant 1998 prices  
(deflated with revaluation coefficients,  computed for every enterprise)  
                            
1 NACE - the General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities within the European Communities. 
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jitL ,       - average annual number of employees 
Then TFP is calculated as follows: 
jitkjjitljjitjit KLYTFP ,,,, lnlnlnln αα −−=                                                (2) 
The TFP growth rates could be calculated  by following way: 
 
jitjitjit TFPTFPTFP ,1,, lnlnln −−=Δ                                                                     (3) 
In reality,  residuals obtained from estimated Cobb-Douglas production function (Solow residual), is  productivity P (or 
growth rate of productivity), which is highly correlated with TFP in level and TFP growth rate, though not equal to them2.   To 
obtain more reliable results alternative Jorgenson (1995) method of estimation of TFP, is used. According this method 
translog specification of industry specific production functions is estimated separately for  24 sectors (2-digit NACE 
industries )  using  following equation:   
 
ttLKtLLtKKtKtLit KLLKKLY ln)(ln)(lnlnlnln
22
0 αααααα +++++=                      (4) 
The TFP is obtained as residuals from estimated  production function. One critical feature of this method is that TFP can be 
estimated without a presumption that factor prices are equal to marginal products. The TFP growth rate is obtained as the 
difference between the output growth rate and input growth rates multiplied by corresponding elasticities ( ). 
_η
 
)/ln()/()/ln()/ln( 1111 −−−− −−= ttLttKtttt LLKKLnYYAA ηη                                     (5) 
 
where 
_η K    and  L  calculated as  in (6) _η
2/)( 1,, −
− += tKtKK ηηη                                                   (6) 2/)( 1,, −
− += tLtLL ηηη
 
and 
                            
2 See  Escribano  and Guasch ( 2004) for overview. 
 
 
 9
ηK,t =  tLKtKKK
t
t LK
K
Y
lnln2
ln
ln ∧∧∧ ++=∂
∂ ααα                                             (7) 
  
ηL,t =  tLKtLLL
t
t KL
L
Y
lnln2
ln
ln ∧∧∧ ++=∂
∂ ααα                                                                    (8) 
 
Another option to estimate  Cobb-Douglas production functions using panel data covering a large sample of companies 
observed for a small number of time periods is an extended GMM estimator, proposed by Blundel and Bond (1999). 
According to them, the Cobb-Douglas production function is considered as: 
)(lnlnlnln 1, ititittiitKitLit mvYKLY ++++++= − ηγραα      
ittiit evv += −1,ρ                                                                                                  (9) 
 
Where lnYit  is log sales of  firm i in year t, lnLit is log employment, lnKit is log capital stock, tγ    is a year specific intercept. 
Of the error components, iη  - an unobserved firm-specific effect, vit - a possibly autoregressive (productivity) shock and mit 
denotes serially uncorrelated measurement errors.  
 
It is presumed that  both employment (Lit) and capital (Kit) are potentially correlated with the firm-specific effects ( iη ), and 
with both productivity shocks (eit) and measurement errors (mit): The model has a dynamic presentation: 
 
)1(()(lnlnlnlnlnln 1,1,1,11, −−−−− −++−+−++−+−= tiitititittiitKitKtiLitLit mmeYKKLLY ρρηργγρρααραα
                                                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                 (10) 
or 
)(lnlnlnlnlnln **1,51431,21 itittiitittiitit wYKKLLY ++++−−= −−− ηγπππππ  
                                                                                                                                             (11) 
To obtain  consistent estimation of the parameters ( ραα ;; KL ), when the number of firms (N) is large and the number of 
years (T) is fixed, I use extended GMM estimator in which lagged first-differences of the series are used as tools for the 
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levels equations in addition to lagged levels of dependent variable as tools for equations in first differences (system GMM). 
TFP is calculated as residuals from this form of production function and TFP growth as in (3). 
 
Summing up, using data available TFP of individual firms are calculated by  following way: 
1) as a residual from a fixed effects estimation of the loglinear Cobb –Douglas production function; 
2) using Jorgenson method (translog specification for estimating production function); 
3) using GMM estimator for autoregressive model of  Cobb –Douglas production function 
In all approaches differences in factor shares by industrial sectors are allowed.  
 
3.2. Measuring Allocative Efficiency 
 
Aggregate productivity and its growth depend both on how productive businesses are on average and on whether more 
productive businesses have a higher market share. 
Olley and Pakes [1996] demonstrate this formally by decomposing aggregate productivity as follows: 
      jit
Hit
t
jittjtj pspP ,
1
,∑
=
ΔΔ+=                                   (12) 
jtjitjit sss ,,, −=Δ              jtjitjit ppp ,,, −=Δ   (13) 
 
 where i denotes firm, t denotes time, j denotes 2-digit NACE industry, bar denotes unweighted average, H represents the 
number of firms, s is firm’s domestic market share in industry j and p is a measure of productivity. In this study, TFP is used 
as a measure of productivity.  The first term in (12) is unweighted average productivity in industry j at time t, while the 
second term is a covariance term measuring cross-sectional allocative efficiency and demonstrating whether activity is 
disproportionately located in high-productivity (in case the term is positive) or low-productivity (in case the term is negative) 
firms.  In addition to providing a compact measure of allocative efficiency, one more advantage of covariance resides in the 
fact that it is more comparable across sectors than average productivity itself, since the first moment differences across 
sectors are differenced out. It is a cross-sectional measure. 
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The covariance term is defined as a cross product between the percentage deviation of the firm-held market share from the 
average market share in industry j and the deviation of the firm’s log productivity from the average firm-level log productivity 
in industry j and might be interpreted as the contribution of a firm to aggregate allocative efficiency.  
 
In comparison to decomposition methods proposed by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001), this method of decomposition 
has two main advantages: differences in productivity cross-sectionally are more persistent and less prone to measurement 
error and transitory shocks, and in addition to continuing firms, entering and exiting firms could be included in sample. 
 
 
 
A firm-level measure of allocative efficiency could be calculated as follows (see Schweiger (2006)).  
                                          jit
jt
jti p
s
s
,
,
, ΔΔ                        (14)              
 
This study considers measure (14) as indicator of  allocative efficiency.  
 
3.3. Empirical Model 
 
 Evaluation of impact of state aid on TFP of a firm and allocative efficiency is a typical problem of estimation of the so-called 
treatment effects. There are different methodologies of evaluation of treatment effects depending on data available (see 
Caliendo and Hujer, 2005 for overview). They have been developed due to the need to evaluate efficacy of different political 
(or medical) programs proposing nonrandom sampling of their participants. Conclusion on influence of such programs 
implies a presumption as to what could happen if an individual (firm), which was selected to be involved in the program, had 
not participated in the program. Difficulty of evaluation is that it is not possible to review it experimentally. In addition, in 
evaluating treatment effects, a problem of selection bias inevitably arises since in our case the firm which received the state 
aid (treated) usually differs in terms of other parameters from the firm which did not receive it. Depending on how they 
handle selection bias, it is possible to group non-experimental treatment effects estimators under two categories. The first 
category includes estimators which rely on selection of observable variables and the second category includes estimators 
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which explicitly allow the selection of unobservable variables. OLS regression implicitly relies on the assumption of selection 
of observable variables. The equation of interest can have the following form: 
itititit uXSAy +++= −− ηαα 1110     (15) 
where i denotes firms, t denotes time, y is the outcome variable of interest (covariance term, growth of market share or 
growth of productivity), SA is the ratio of  state aid to sales  (two types of state aid are defined depending on goals they 
pursued).  X is a vector of control variables. The assumption needed for identification of the average treatment effect of aid 
is that conditioning linearly on X is sufficient to eliminate selection bias. This assumption might fail resulting in biased 
estimates. The bias may occur due to the reasons described hereinafter. 
 
 
Firstly, many financially distressed enterprises prefer not to resort to state aid: subject to the legislation, an enterprise 
claiming the state aid has to make all current payments to the budget, which is a condition for eligibility for the state aid. In 
such situation, many enterprises prefer to further accrue the tax debt and other compulsory payments to the budget and not 
to apply for the state aid. In addition, small-sized enterprises being worse off financially are deprived of the aid. In this case, 
the OLS coefficients will be biased upwards. 
 
Secondly, providing the state aid to enterprises under the Program of Stimulating the Industrial Production presumes 
selection of the most viable enterprises (to pick the winners). If it is the case, OLS coefficients will be biased upwards as 
well.  
 
 Thirdly, in case of providing the state aid to the known poorly performing enterprises in  one -company-towns  or operating 
in the declining industries (programs of support to the machine-building and metal working enterprises with a lengthy 
production cycle, radio electronic enterprises, agricultural machinery enterprises, peat-extraction enterprises, etc.), the OLS 
coefficients will be biased downwards. 
 
This problem may be solved by using the instrumental variables method. Instrumental variables should comply with the 
following requirements: they should determine treatment participation (the probability of receiving aid), but do not influence 
the outcome equation, i.e. not correlated with error term in a regression of TFP on state aid with  given control variables ( X).      
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However, a good instrument is hard to come by in general, and in our case, in particular, because there are no obvious rules 
for granting state aid for industrial enterprises. Moreover, different kinds of state aid were provided in compliance with 
different rules. It means that the excluded instruments used in the IV regressions should be different for different types of 
state aid.  
 
For enterprises that received state aid due to their financial distress the share of the region’s population employed by the 
firm and credit liabilities as percent of debt receivables could be used as instruments. However, these instruments are not 
appropriate for enterprises that received state aid in order to expand their investment and export opportunities. 
Besides, the dependent variables in estimation (TFP, market share and covariance term) are most likely autocorrelated.   
 
That is why, alternatively, the Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic panel estimators is used (System GMM). 
The supple GMM framework fits unbalanced panel data and manifold endogenous variables. This estimator is particularly 
designed for analysis of panel data which is characterized  by small T(time period) and  large N (enterprises in our case), a 
dynamic dependent variable, fixed  effects, and a lack of good external instruments(Roodman, 2006). This method 
estimates a system of equations in levels and first differences using as instruments, respectively, lagged first differences 
and lagged levels of endogenous variables (as well as lags and leads of exogenous variables).  In a model with a dynamic 
dependent variable, this approach is superior to ordinary least squares, which causes an upward bias, and to the fixed 
effects estimator, which produces a downward bias in the estimated coefficients. This method also tends to perform better 
than the difference GMM approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) based on equations in first differences only, particularly in 
the case of persistent series, when lagged levels provide weak instruments for the subsequent first differences. However, 
use of System GMM requires additional assumption, that first differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with the 
fixed effects. To test whether the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is specified correctly, three diagnostic statistics are normally 
reported – the Sargan (Hansen in robust estimations) test for over-identifying restrictions and tests for first and second-order 
serial correlation. The GMM estimator is appropriately specified, if the over-identifying restrictions are not rejected3, the test 
for first-order serial correlation cannot reject the null hypothesis on no correlation, but the test for second-order serial 
correlation does reject the null hypothesis of no correlation by any standard levels of significance. Since the equation is 
 
3 The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the instruments are jointly exogenous. Hence,  
an increasingly high p-value of the Sargan statistic is preferential. It is worth noting, that instead of the Sargan statistic Stata uses the  
Hansen J statistic, which has the same null hypothesis. 
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estimated in first differenced form, the equation will show first-order serial correlation4. However, of importance is the 
absence of second-order serial correlation, if the error term in the levels equation is white noise5. Therefore, a test of 
second-order serial correlation is reported and is asymptotically N(0,1) distributed. 
 
The equation for TFP have the following form: 
itittititi XSATFPTFP εηαα +++= −− 1,21,1,  (16) 
where    is  the ratio of  state aid to sales (first type - for financially distressed firms, and second type – to  expand  
investment opportunities; these ratios are used  in different regressions),  
1, −tiSA
ηitX  - is a vector of control variables (share of 
the state in shareholders’ equity, share of foreign investor in shareholders’ equity, share of export in output and log 
employment as proxy to size of enterprises, year and sector dummies).The similar equations are  estimated  for market 
share deviation  and  for covariance term as dependent variables.  Market share deviation is defined as  percentage 
deviation of the firm-held market share from the average market share of the firm in industry,  covariance term is defined as 
a cross product between market share deviation and the deviation of the firm’s log productivity from the average firm-level 
log productivity in industry (13). The dynamic panel estimation that is used allows to analyze whether and how state aid 
affects the change in, rather than merely the level of  productivity,  market share and allocative efficiency of firms. 
Another option to test dynamic effect of state aid on firms’ productivity  is to estimate log-linear production function at the 
firm level augmented with variable “state aid”   using the system GMM method for following specification (see Aitken and 
Harrison (1999), Konning, 2000): 
ititititit SAKLY εαααα ++−+= −13210 lnlnln   (17) 
 
The estimated  coefficient on variable SA in (17) will show the influence of state aid on the change in total factor productivity. 
 
                            
4 In order to detect autocorrelation, one needs to apply the Arellano –Bond test to the differenced residuals. The null hypothesis of this 
test is that the model exhibits no autocorrelation. When testing for AR (1) process in the first-difference , the null hypothesis is usually 
rejected due to the fact that  
1−−=Δ ititit εεε  and 211 −−− −=Δ ititit εεε   both have 1−itε  
 
 
5 Autocorrelation in levels is frequently detected by the AR(2) test in first differences.  
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It could be hypothesized  that the effect of state aid may manifest itself in the change of the production function of firms-
recipients, rather than in higher/lower total factor productivity. To examine this issue in a dynamic setting, I look at the 
effects that state aid  has on the capital/labor ratio of firms- recipients: 
 
itittititi XSALKLK εηαα +++= −− 1,21,1, )/ln()/ln(  (18) 
 
The estimated   coefficient of variable SA in (18) will show whether state aid affects the change in capital/labor ratio in the 
following year keeping in mind that higher capital/labor ratio is usually associated with more advanced technology and vice 
versa. 
 
As was mentioned previously, the main goal of the state aid of the first type is to support employment. To see whether this 
goal is actually achieved I run additional regressions. The dependent variable is the deviation of the employment growth at 
particular enterprise from the average by industry, and the explanatory variables are the same as in (18).  
itittititi XSAEMPGRDEVEMPGRDEV εηαα +++= −− 1,21,1, __   (19) 
 
Even though in all regressions I control for the size of enterprises (via the logarithm of the number of employees variable), to 
examine the issue in greater detail (to reveal possible non-linearity), in addition I divided the sample into three groups and 
ran separate regressions for each of them: 
• Less than 200 employees (considered as small enterprises according to the Law on Small Entrepreneurship) – 11802 
observations 
• 200-1000 employees (medium enterprises)– 5636 observations, 
• Over 1000 employees (large enterprises)  – 1780  observations.   
 
To find out whether coefficients of state aid for enterprises of different sizes obtained from separate regressions are 
different,  it would be necessary to perform specific significance test (Chow test 6). For this purpose  I test the null 
                            
6 A Chow test is a test of whether the coefficients estimated over one group of the data are equal  to the coefficients estimated over 
other. 
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hypothesis about  equality of regression coefficients among three size groups . 
 
Ho: B1 = B2 = B3 
 
where B1 is the regressions coefficient for the small enterprises, B2 is the regression coefficient for the middle enterprises, 
and B3 is the regression coefficient for large enterprises. Since we are interested mainly in differences in meaning and 
statistical significance of the differences in the coefficients for state aid, to do this analysis, all specifications are 
supplemented  with a dummy variables for size and their  interactions with variable for aid 7  which were used as additional 
predictors. The equation  for TFP has the following form: 
 
TFPi,t = a1 TFPi,t-1 + a2 SAi,t-1 + a3STSHi,t + a4FDIi,t + a5EXPIi,t +  a6SIZE1 + a7SIZE2 + a8SIZE1 XSAi,t-1 
 
                         + a9SIZE2 XSAi,t-1 +YR +IND + ŋi,t                      (20) 
 
where SA  is  ratio of state aid to sales(%),STSH is state share in shareholders’ equity, FDI  is  share of foreign investor in 
shareholders’ equity, EXP is share of export in sales (%); SIZE1 and SIZE2 are dummies for small and medium enterprises; 
SIZEXSA  and SIZE2 XSA  are interaction variables;   YR  and IND  are   year and  sector dummies. The similar  
specifications are  calculated for deviation from employment growth,  market share, covariance term,  indicating allocative 
efficiency, and capital/labor ratio as dependent variables with  control variables like in (20) and for sales as dependent  
variable with controls for capital and labor inputs.  
4. Data Sources and Dataset   
  
In this study several data sets will be used. The first one is based on the reported company accounts of more than 2,000 
incorporated firms in the manufacturing sector and are obtained from the  National Statistical Committee of the Republic of 
Belarus (Belstat).  Only the so-called “closed” enterprises (mostly in defense industry) are excluded from this data set. The 
 
7 I first made a dummy variable called size1 that is coded 1 if small enterprises 0 otherwise, and size2 that is coded 1 if middle sized, 0 
otherwise. Besides, interactive variables size1_aid1 that is size1 times aid1, and size1_aid1 that is size2 times aid1 were created. 
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data cover the years of 1998-2007. Confidentiality of this data set has to be preserved. This sample covers more than 90% 
of total sales in manufacturing as reported by the Belstat.  Therefore, the data can be considered as extremely 
representative of the population of firms in manufacturing. The data contains detailed information on employment, sales, 
fixed assets, export and finished-goods inventory in the warehouses. Each enterprise has an ownership code, but more 
detailed data on ownership structure were retrieved from the State Register of Economic Entities. It allows for measuring the 
fractions of shares in firms held by the state and by private investors, and distinguishing explicitly between private domestic 
investors and foreign investors. In addition, the data on the regional location of enterprises are available in the database. 
These data have been thoroughly treated to remove inconsistencies and improve missing longitudinal linkages due to 
change of firm identifier from one year to the next (for instance, related to reorganizations and changes of a legal form). The 
data from multiple sources were used to evaluate inconsistencies (including the previous year’s data contained in the 
registries). Longitudinal linkages were improved based on the entire information available, including industry, region, size 
and some exact linking variables (e.g., names of a firm), to match the firms that exited from the data set in a given year with 
those that entered in the following year.  
To deflate output I used PPI indices  specific for every enterprise, computed using data on output in comparable and actual 
prices for every year.8 Capital deflators were obtained in a different way. The value of a Belorussian firm’s capital stock is 
subject to revaluation every year as of 1 January, so reported end-of-year and start-of-year capital stocks differ by the 
revaluation coefficient.  I computed these revaluation coefficients for every enterprise and used them as deflators for capital 
stock.9 
 
 
8  Sectoral PPI are calculated based on the producers’ data on change in prices for essential products (representative products) 
manufactured by a particular sector (branch of industry). These data  are used to compute  average PPI for particular industries and are 
based on the structure of output that is typical for the industry as a whole (and which differs from structure of output  at each individual 
enterprise). Therefore, PPI only approximately reflects changes in prices for the products manufactured by each individual enterprise. 
For this reason I used the data on output in comparable prices (i.e. prices of the previous year) based on actual price changes for 
particular products annually calculated at each enterprise. This allowed to calculate more precisely actual real annual output growth.  
Using price growth chain indices calculated in this way, I have computed output in the 1998 prices. The data obtained differ from those 
which were calculated using industry average PPI. 
 
9Due to high inflation rates over the period in question (over 20% a year), the Belarusian enterprises annually reappraised fixed assets 
using three methods: 1) index method (the technique applied to  compute 35 sectoral PPIs depending on the fixed assets structure); 2) 
direct estimate method based on existing market prices; and 3) currency conversion method, if the equipment was imported. While the 
majority of enterprises reappraised fixed assets using the index method, there is no unified reappraisal index method, since the fixed 
assets structure of various enterprises differs considerably. Since our data contain the fixed assets value before and after reappraisal, 
the ratio of these values may be taken as the reappraisal index. It is also worth mentioning that the index method, as the experts state, 
most frequently leads to overestimation of the fixed assets, the fact that should be taken into account in interpreting the results.       
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I use 2-digit OKED classification, that groups firms  by areas of major activity, which is equivalent to  NACE (15-36, 94) 
classification. This classification allows for more precise estimations (24 industries instead of 9 according OKONH 
classification. See Appendix). A number of firms that listed a non-manufacturing occupation as their major NACE industry 
was excluded. Besides, firms in the top and bottom one percent of either the TFP distribution or the annual TFP growth 
distribution were dropped, so that outliers do not drive the results. 
 
The data on the state subsidies and loans and tax allowances provided to the enterprises were obtained from the Ministry of 
Economy and Ministry of Finance.  The enterprises that receive aid were divided into two groups depending on goal of state 
aid 1) to prevent their bankruptcy and maintain employment; 2) to expand their investment and export opportunities. This 
grouping was  obtained through the analysis of the programs based on which the aid was provided to enterprises and for 
this purpose respective normative and legal framework has been analyzed (list of enterprises attached to Decrees of the 
President, Resolutions of the Council of Ministers and other ministries and also Regional Authorities). 
 
Notwithstanding the efforts to clean the data, improve the links and make them as comparable as possible across firms and 
over time, measurement errors may still persist.  Mismeasurement of productivity owing to errors in output, capital or labor 
could raise the variance of the estimated productivity effect and produce biased coefficients. The approach to analyzing an 
extensive range of alternative estimation methods is motivated to some degree by the possibility of such measurement 
problems and also by an intention to assess the robustness of findings. However, none of the methods is capable of 
improving the effects of measurement error entirely that should be considered when evaluating the results. 
5. Estimation Results   
5.1. Estimation Results for TFP  
 
 Table 1 summarizes the results of the TFP growth rate estimated  separately for 2-digit NACE industries obtained from  
production function estimation with loglinear  Cobb-Douglas production function (fixed effect technique),  translog 
specification  (Jorgenson method) and  System GMM technique.  
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Table 1. TFP growth rates 
 Loglinear specification   Translog specification System GMM specification 
 
Enterprise
s  with 
state aid 1 
 
Enterprise
s  with 
state aid 2 
Enterprise
s without 
aid 
Enterprise
s  with 
state aid 1 
Enterprise
s  with 
state aid 2 
Enterprise
s without 
aid 
Enterprise
s  with 
state aid 1 
Enterprise
s  with 
state aid 2 
Enterprise
s without 
aid 
1999 .2075 .2112 .2021 .0352 . 1081 .1082 - - - 
2000 .0732 .0812 .0668 .0112 .0122 .0138 .0041 .0081 .0098 
2001 .0824 .0877 .0875 .0145 .0229 .0224 .0235 .0185 .0170 
2002 .0271 .0325 .0576 .0054 .0060 .0091 .0021 .0102 .0104 
2003 .0386 .0537 .0645 -.0091 -.0007 .0047 -.0156 -.0127 -.0022 
2004 .0115 .0763 .0579 .0104 .0235 .0217 .0133 .0187 .0119 
2005 .0366 .0606 .0732 .0308 .0256 .0307 .0199 .0214 .0205 
2006 .0443 .0568 .0625 .0008 .0208 .0301 .0207 .0189 .0170 
2007 .0434 .0545 .0594 .0017 .0199 .0286 -.0066 .0119 .0131 
Mean  .0627 .0794 .0813 .0112 .0265 .0299 .0077 .0119 .0122 
 
 
I found that the rank ordering and the quantitative variation in firm-level TFP and growth rate of TFP were not very 
susceptible of  the estimation methodology used to calculate TFP, in spite of variation in the factor elasticities. The 
correlation coefficients between the various pairs of measures obtained from loglinear  specification Cobb-Douglas 
production function (fixed effect technique)  and  translog specification are  0.91 or higher. This finding is similar in spirit to 
the finding of Van Biesebroeck (2004) who finds that the distributional properties of firm-level TFP are reasonably robust to a 
wide variety of estimation methods. However, correlation coefficients  between firm-level TFP obtained from System GMM  
technique and loglinear or translog  specifications are  lower  (0,66  and 0,61on average), probably because of dynamic 
essence of estimations.  That is why I use  different measures of productivity (TFP)  to obtain consistent evaluation of effects 
of state aid on TFP  growth rates.  
As Table 1 shows, in all specifications firms without state aid have  the highest  TFP growth rates; enterprises, that received  
state aid 2 demonstrate on average higher  TFP  growth rates than enterprises that received state aid1.  It remains to be 
seen of course, whether this results holds after controlling for other factors of TFP growth and for endogeneity.   
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5.2. Allocative Efficiency Estimation 
 
In this Section I report allocative efficiency estimation results. Tables 2 and 3 below summarize these results. Market share 
growth rates during the period in question were negative, i.e. level of concentration decreased,  but more so for firm-years 
with aid.  In aggregate terms, the static allocative efficiency of Belarusian  manufacturing, calculated as a weighted average 
of 2-digit industry aggregate covariance terms was positive in most calculations, except for some years, when using System 
GMM technique.  
 
Table 2. Olley-Pakes Covariance and Growth Market Share in Manufacturing, 1999-2007 
 
Growth market share Covariance term (mean) 
Loglinear 
specification 
Translog (Jorgenson) 
specification 
 
System GMM 
specification 
Year 
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
1999 -.0639 .0090 .1273 .0099 .1238 .0102     
2000 -.0075 .0074 .0372 .0035 .0241 .0028 .0014 .0084 
2001 -.0420 .0072 .0311 .0050 .0203 .0037 .0131 .0040 
2002 -.0503 .0074 .0350 .0052      .0218 .0042 .0149 .0038 
2003 -.0499 .0082 .0633 .0080 .0484 .0066 .0425 .0078 
2004 -.0076 .0019 .0018 .0001 .0010 .0002 -.0002 .0005 
2005 -.0240 .0019 .0015 .0002 .0011 .0003 -.0003 .0005 
2006     -.0305 .0017 .0023 .0099 .0025 .0102 .0012 .0065 
2007    -.0024 .0027 .0034 .0032 .0028 .0022 .0009 .0031 
Total     -.0350      .0053          .0337    .0053 .0273 .0034 .0103 .0036 
 
Our main interest is the impact of state aid on TFP of individual firms and allocative efficiency, i.e. differences in market 
share changes for firms which receive different type of aid and do not receive aid at all. Table 3 shows that market share 
decreased faster in firms without state aid and with state aid of first type, i.e. for firms receiving aid due to financial distress. 
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Covariance terms are higher in firms which received state aid. The standard deviations of these variables indicate that there 
is a lot of heterogeneity among firms. 
 
Table 3. Olley-Pakes Covariance and Growth Market Share in Manufacturing for firms with Different Types 
of State aid   without it. 
Covariance term  Growth market share 
Loglinear 
specification 
Translog 
(Jorgenson) 
specification 
System GMM 
specification 
 Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
Enterprises with 
aid1 -.0327 .0049 .5482 .0644 -.0160 .0098 .0240 .0195 
Enterprises with 
aid2 -.0172 .0051 .6125 .1687 -.0124 .0307 .3545 .1108 
Enterprises 
without aid -.0370 .0033 .6983 .0215 -.0019 .0030 .0491 .0209 
 
5.3. Impact of State Aid on  Enterprises’ Performance 
 
 
 Tables 4 and  6  present  the results of regressions (coefficients on state aid ) for state aid of first and second type 
respectively. In first column the samples are defined.  The second  column reports the coefficients on state aid obtained 
from the regression using equation  (16) where TFP is used as dependent variable. In the right hand side of equation  - 
lagged TFP,  control variables (share of the state in shareholders’ equity, share of foreign investor in shareholders’ equity, 
share of export in output , log employment as proxy for  size of enterprises) and  year and sector dummies. Similar 
equations are estimated  for employment growth deviation, market share deviation and  covariance term as dependent  
variables. Regressions coefficients of variables “Staid Aid” obtained from these equations are reported respectively in 
columns  4-6.  Employment growth deviation is defined as deviation of the firm’s employment growth rate from average 
growth rate in industry. Market share deviation is defined as deviation of the firm-held market share from the average market 
share in industry.  Covariance term is defined as a cross product between the percentage market share deviation and the 
deviation of the firm’s log productivity from the average firm-level log productivity in industry (as in (14)).  
 
In third column of both tables dependent variable is the log of sales and regression is calculated according to equation (17),  
i. e. log-linear production function at the firm level augmented with variable “state aid” is estimated.   
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All equations are calculated using the system GMM method (Arellano-Bond technique). In order to avoid second order serial 
correlation  (AR(2)) and to obtain valid instruments for suspected to be endogenous variables, in all regressions different 
lags of these variables (third and deeper lags) are used.  The variables ‘share of the state’,  ‘share of foreign direct 
investment’, ‘share of export ‘ and ‘log employment’ (and their interactions) are treated  as endogenous.  P-value of   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2),  Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions are not reported in tables,  because 
all coefficients are obtained from different regressions. However, the P-values of these statistics in all regressions fall 
between  0.1 and 1 and  are in support of the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid ( the results  available under 
request). I report results only for TFP obtained as residuals from loglinear specification of production function, because other 
measures of TFP gave  similar results, but again, these results are available upon request. 
 
5.3.1.State Aid of First Type  
 
As it was mentioned previously,  the state aid of the first type is provided to financially troubled enterprises. The main goal of 
state aid of this type is to avoid bankruptcy and to support employment. Table 4 displays the results. Regressing the total 
factor productivity on state aid for the whole sample of enterprises (19, 47 observations) reveals negative and significant 
impact of aid of the first type: state aid is negatively associated with productivity of recipient firms in the same sector next 
year. In other words, the  higher the relative amount of state aid of the first type, the less productively the firm performs next 
year.  The increase in aid/sales ratio by 1 percentage point was associated with decrease in total factor productivity by 3.8 
percentage points. This result could be explained by the fact that the mean value of the ratio of state aid1 to sales is 
relatively small (3.9% ) which is considerably less than tax burden on a average  industrial enterprise  (according to my own 
calculations, total tax rate  as %  of sale in Belarusian industry during the period in question was about 16% 10). In this case, 
this type of aid is frequently provided in the form of tax debt relief. It is obvious that state aid of this type is most frequently 
inadequate for comprehensive restructuring of enterprises and increasing TFP and only prolong their existence.   
 
The same regression for the smaller sample – only for enterprises receiving state aid (3,934 observations for 1,683 
enterprises ) – gives different results: no significant impact of state aid on TFP growth. The interpretation is straightforward: 
the corrupting effect of state aid on TFP does not depend on the amount of given aid; the mere fact that the enterprise is 
 
10 According to World Bank Report “Doing Business” and own calculations, the mean value of total taxes to profits ratio in Belarus in 
1998 – 2007 was  134.7%. As to the tax burden degree, the World Bank ranks Belarus the last out of 183 countries. 
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included in the list of the government grantees (even when the actual amount of aid is very small) is considered as a 
guarantee of future survival without bankruptcy, so the management stops caring about efficiency. It is consistent with the 
fact that in recent 10 years not a single enterprise with over 50 employees went bankrupt in the Belarusian industry.  
 
Table. 4. Impact of First Type State Aid on Growth of TFP, Employment, Market Share and Allocative 
Efficiency  
 
Impact on TFP  
 
Sample 
TFP as  
dependent        
variable 
Log of sales  
as  
dependent        
variable 
Impact on 
employment  
Impact on 
market share  
Impact on 
allocative 
efficiency 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Whole sample 
(19,218 observations;  
2,335 firms) 
-.0377**   
(.0184)    
 -.0199* 
(.0117) 
 
-.0439    
(.0981)  
 
.2505  
(.3427)     
 
.0165   
(.0112) 
Оnly for firms with aid of first type 
(3,934 observations, 
1,690 firms) 
-.0009   
(.0009)     
-.0007 
  (.0011)     
.0319**   
(.0161) 
.0269  
 (.0204 )    
     
.0011  
(0009) 
Firms with less than 200 employees 
(11,802 observations 
I,628 firms) 
 -.0291**  
(.0148)    
-.0190*  
(.0112)  
 
-.0946     
(.0588 )  
 
-.0496  
( .0755)    
    
.0015*   
(.0008 )      
Firms with employees with more 
than 200, but less than 1,000  
(5,636 observations, 
717 firms) 
.0009   (.0114) 
 
     
.0107 
(.0142)  
    
-.0386  
( .0710) 
.0389    
(.0283) 
 
 
.0019   
(.0021)  
  
Firms with more than 1,000 
employees 
(1,780 observations, 
201 firms). 
 -.0193**   
(.0103)  
    
-.0040*   
(.0024)    
 
 .0699**   
(.0311) 
 
.0153* 
( .0093)   
 
-.0098 *  
(.0061) 
 
 
Note: * - significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in brackets. 
Year and sector dummies are included. 
 
To check the robustness, I also regressed sales on state aid with controls for capital and labor inputs.. The results are very 
similar: negative relationship for the whole sample and no relationship for the reduced sample (only enterprises receiving 
state aid). According to results obtained from regression for the whole sample, increase in aid/sales ratio by 1 percentage 
point was associated with decrease in the firm’s sales by 1.99 p.p 11 holding all other independent variables constant at their 
                            
11 When the outcome variable (sale) is log transformed, there is natural  interpretation of the exponentiated regression coefficients 
(exp(X)-1)*100). These values correspond to changes in the ratio of the expected geometric means of the original outcome variable. 
However, for small values of coefficients a change in independent variable by one unit is approximately associated with a* 100% change 
in dependent variable (Stock and Watson, 2003). 
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mean values.  
 
For both specifications (for TFP and sales as dependent variables), the regressions for three groups of enterprises of 
different size were run. The results are similar – negative impact of state aid on TFP in the following year for all groups of 
small and large enterprises, but insignificant for medium enterprises.  There are certain non-linearities, though: the 
coefficients at the state aid variable for small enterprises are -.029 (-.019 in second specification) and for large enterprises –  
-.019 (-.004 in second specification) - see Table 4. It looks like the negative impact of the state aid 1 is especially ruinous for 
small enterprises: with probability of 90%, increase in aid/sales ratio by 1 percentage point leads to decrease in the small 
firm’s TFP by 2.9 p.p. and sales - by 1.9 p.p. at mean value of state aid. 
 
However, to be able to make claims about differences among the regression coefficients on state aid for enterprises of 
different sizes, there would be needed to perform specific significance test (Chow test) for specification with interaction 
variables estimated for full sample (20). The results of estimations are presented in Table 5. 
  
The analysis showed that the null hypothesis about equality of coefficients  could be rejected (F= 2.58  Prob > F =  0.0757) 
(column 2, Table 5). It means that the regression coefficients between aid1 and TFP do indeed significantly differ across the 
3 size groups. Significance of overall interaction indicates that the effect of state aid1 on the TFP is conditional upon the size 
of enterprises.12 However, comparing slope of aid 1 at each size category it appears that slopes between size1 (small 
enterprises) and size 3 (large enterprises) do not differ significantly, but slopes between combined groups of small and large 
enterprises vs. group of medium enterprises differ (as shown in Table 5, coefficients for interactions between aid 1 and size 
1 is negative and insignificant, but between aid 1 and size 2 is positive and significant at 10% level). In other words, despite 
the results, obtained from separate regressions, small and large enterprises perform in approximately similar way: increase 
in aid/sales ratio at mean value is associated with statistically significant decrease in the firm’s TFP next  year 13,  i.e. they 
generally fail to use state aid of first type  effectively. However, medium-size enterprises did not experience negative 
influence of state aid on their TFP, i.e. they perform relatively better in terms of effectiveness probably because they are 
more stable than small enterprises and more flexible than large ones. 
 
12A significant categorical by continuous interaction means that the slope of the continuous variable is different for one or more levels of 
the categorical variable. 
 
13 These results did not change significantly at median value of aid/sales ratio. 
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Similar results were obtained from specification with sales as dependent variable (with controls for capital and labor inputs). 
However, they suggest  that small enterprises with state aid of first type perform significantly worse than large ones: 
coefficients for interactions between aid1 and size1 are negative and significant. It means that an increase in aid/sales ratio 
by 1 p. p leads to a more significant decrease in the small firm’s sales by approximately 1.5 p.p. as compared to  large firms. 
Table 5.  Results of Tests on Equality of Coefficients of State Aid of First Type Between Enterprises of 
Different Size Groups 
 Dependent variable in models with interaction terms 
 TFP  Sale  Deviation from 
employment 
growth   
 
Market share 
deviation  
Covariance 
term  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Difference in slope between 
small and large enterprises  
(coefficient on aid1xsize1)14
 -.0339   
(.0372)         
-.0486*    
(.0256 )    
-.0337 * 
 (.0482 )   
 -.1215 *  
(.715)    
.0015**   
(.007)    
Difference in slope  between 
medium and large enterprises  
(coefficient aid1xsize2)   
  .1771*   
(.0092)     
  .0151*  
.(0085)     
-.07452**   
(.03203  )   
.2322 
  (.1678)  
.0002   
(.0034)     
P-value of test for significance 
of overall interaction (Chow test) 
 0.0757 0.0696 
 
 0.0624 
 
0.0726 
 
 0.0549 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
With regards to the effect of first type aid on employment, it was found that for the whole sample aid1 does not have a 
significant impact, but for the sample of enterprises that receive aid1 its impact on employment is significantly positive (the 
increase in aid/sales ratio by 1 p.p. raises deviation from annual employment growth rate in the sector  by  3.2 p.p.).  In other 
words, the more relative amount of state aid of the first type, the more employment growth compared to the average over 
industry in the following year. The effect is stronger for large enterprises (the increase in aid/sales ratio by 1 p.p. raises the 
deviation from average employment growth rate in industry by  6.9 p.p.). So, it looks like state aid of the first type provided to 
large enterprises really helps to increase employment, but at the expense of TFP growth. For small- and medium-size 
enterprises, the increase in employment due to state aid1 is insignificant, although the slowdown of TFP for small firms is 
pronounced (it is confirmed by statistical significance of overall interaction in both regressions). So, if first type state aid is a 
                            
14 The magnitude of coefficients does not appropriately reflect difference in marginal effect between size group in case of Arellano—
Bond estimation, but the sign and significance of these coefficients do matter. 
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game that is worth a candle (increase in employment at the expense of slowdown of TFP growth), it is the case only for 
large enterprises, but not so for small and medium size firms. Or, to put it differently, if the efficiency of state aid is measured 
as the sum of the generated increase in employment and decrease in TFP growth, then this efficiency is rather high for 
large-scale enterprises.  
 
The impact of state aid of the fist type on the increase in the market share is again significant only for large firms: the 
increase in aid/sales ratio by 1 p.p. raises market share by 1.5 p.p.  Chow test for significance of overall interaction (reported 
in column 5, Table 5) rejects the null hypothesis about equality of coefficients and confirms results obtained from separate 
regressions.    
 
Despite significance of impact of state aid of the fist type on TFP in regression for whole sample, there is no relationship 
between allocative efficiency and aid for the whole sample and for the reduced ones (only enterprises receiving state aid). 
However, the value of coefficients changes in specific regressions for enterprises of different sizes: being insignificant for the 
medium-sized enterprises , they become positive and significant for small firms (increase in aid/sales ratio by 1 p.p. raises 
small firm’s allocative efficiency by approximately 0.15 p.p) and negative and significant for large firms (increase in aid/sales 
ratio by 1 p.p. leads to a decrease in allocative efficiency by approximately  0.1 p.p).  The Chow test  (Prob > F =  0.0549, 
column 6, Table 5) confirms statistical significance of difference of coefficients across the size groups . Interpretation of 
obtained results is obvious: despite the state aid received, the small-sized enterprises reduce their relative share in the 
market faster than the fall in their TFP, and, as a result, the first type state aid does not lead to the reduction in allocative 
efficiency of small-sized enterprises. However, the first type state aid for the large-sized enterprises ultimately lead to 
inefficient allocation of resources in the economy, since this allows them to increase their market share at the cost of 
extensive factors (increase in employment using outdated equipment) against the background of the reduced efficiency in 
term of TFP. 
5.3.2. State Aid of Second Type  
 
As it follows from Table 6, second type of state aid has both positive and statistically significant impact on TFP growth: with 
probability of 90%, increase in aid/sales ratio by 1 percentage point leads to an increase in the firm’s TFP by 0.15 p.p. and 
sales -  by 0.6 p.p. at mean value of state aid to sales ratio. It should be noted that the size of state matters: in the sample of 
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only those enterprises which received the state aid, increase in aid/sales ratio by 1 p. p. results in the TFP growth by 1,85 
p.p next year, and sales – by  0.25 p.p. But as before, this trend is more pronounced for large firms15:  increase in aid/sales 
ratio by 1 p.p.  raises the large  firm’s TFP by  3.2 p.p. and sales -  by 0.3 p.p. at mean value of state aid to sales ratio. Due 
to state aid2, large firms significantly increased their TFP, market shares and, as a result, allocative efficiency  increased by 
0.5 p.p. for every 1 p.p. increase in aid/sales ratio. Furthermore, the growth of the market share was significant only for large 
firms, i.e., ceteris paribus, they grew faster than other enterprises of the sector. Nevertheless, state aid has promoted the 
growth of allocative efficiency in manufacturing as a whole, even though mostly it occurred through the large firms.  
 
Table. 6. Impact of Second Type State Aid on Growth of TFP, Employment, Market Share and Allocative 
Efficiency 
Impact on TFP growth rates 
 
Sample 
TFP as  
dependent        
variable 
Log of sales  as  
dependent     
variable 
Impact on 
employment  
Impact on market 
share  
Impact on 
allocative 
efficiency 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Whole sample  
(19, 218 observations.  
2,335 firms) 
0.0015*   
(.0008)    
.0058* 
  (.0034)     
.0009  
(.0022)      
  
.0003 
(.0003)       
.0039*     
(.0023)       
Only for firms with aid of 
second type (2605  
observations, 
352 firms) 
.0183***   
(.0046) 
.0028 **  
 (.0014)     
.0023**   
 (.0010)      
.0007    
(.0005) 
.0052 
(.0049)      
Firms with less than 200 
employees 
(11,802 observations 
I,628 firms) 
No observation No observations No observations No observations No observations 
Firms with more than 
200 employees, but less 
than 1000  
(5,636 observations, 
717 firms) 
.0115  
 ( .0156)     
.0040  
(.0027) 
.0045  
  (.0028)       
.0002   
(.0003)       
-.0006    
(.0005)    
Firms with more than 
1,000 employees 
(1,780   observations, 
201 firms). 
.0319***   
(.0085) 
 .0031**  
 (.0016)        
.0004   
(.0008)  
 .0013**  
(.0006)      
.0054* 
(.0020)         
 
* - significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in brackets 
Notes: 1) Control variables: share of the state in shareholders’ equity, share of foreign investor in shareholders’ equity, 
share of export in sales and log employment as proxy to size of enterprises. 
2) Year and sector dummies are included. 
 
                            
15 The Chow test results presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7.  Results of Tests on Equality of Coefficients of Second Type of State Aid Between Enterprises of Different 
Size Groups 
 Dependent variable in models with interaction terms 
 TFP  Sale  Deviation from 
employment 
growth   
Market share 
deviation  
Covariance 
term  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
P-value of test for significance 
of difference in coefficients 
between medium and large 
enterprises  (Chow test) 
 0.0056 0.009 
 
 0.236 
 
0.052 
 
 0.032 
 
 
5.3.3. Impact of State Aid on Capital/Labor Ratios 
 
As mentioned earlier, the effect of state aid may manifest itself in the change of the production function of recipient firms 
rather than in higher/lower total factor productivity. To examine this issue, the effects of state aid on the capital/labor ratio of 
recipients firms were examined using the equation (18). Table 8 displays the regression results. 
 
The estimated coefficients on variable State aid1 show that state aid of first type did not have any significant effect on 
capital/labor ratios.  Besides, in the majority of cases, the coefficients have negative sign. On the contrary, obtained 
regression coefficients for state aid2 in all samples confirms that state aid of second type positively and significantly affects 
change in capital/labor ratio. Increase in aid/sales ratio of state aid of second type by 1 p.p. at mean value raises firm’s 
capital/labor ratio by approximately 0.24 p.p. But again, large firms outperform medium ones: they increase their 
capital/labor ratio by 0.38  p.p. on increasing aid/sales ratio by 1 p.p, while  medium firms increase their capital/labor ratio 
only by 0.24  p.p., with all other things being equal. Chow test confirms statistical significance of the difference in obtained 
coefficients. 
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Table 8. Impact of State Aid on Capital/Labor Ratios 
Enterprises with State Aid1 Enterprises with State Aid2 Dependent 
variable: Log 
K/L 
Whole 
sample 
Enterprises 
with less 
than 200 
employees 
Enterprises 
with more 
than 200 
employees, 
but less than 
1,000 
Enterprises 
with more 
than 1,000 
employees 
Whole 
sample 
Enterprises 
with more 
than 200 
employees, 
but less than 
1,000 
Enterprises 
with more 
than 1,000 
employees 
Lagged Log K/L 1.0332***  
(.0416)     
.9864***   
(.0133)     
1.0039***   
(.0312)     
1.0264***   
(.0834)     
.9930***   
(.0262)     
1.006***  
(.0227)     
.9991***   
(.0217)     
Aid1 -.0001   
(.0017)     
.0002   
(.0016)      
-.0007    
(.0026)     
-.0005   
(.0031)    
   
Aid2     .0032**   
(.0014)      
.0024*   
(.0012)      
.0038***    
(.0014)      
Control 
variables 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N groups 1690 1089 511 149 352 190 201 
N observations 3934 2408 1161 361 2605 1118 1488 
P-value  of 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) Test 
0.309 0.443 0.896 0.179 0.939 0.320 0.555 
P-value  of 
Hansen Chi2 
Overid Test 
0.774 0.254 0.425 0.606 0.404 0.842 0.282 
P-value of Chow 
test 
0.363    0.092   
* - significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; standard errors in brackets; p-values in parentheses  
Notes: 1) Control variables: share of the state in shareholders’ equity, share of foreign investor in shareholders’ equity, 
share of export in sales and log employment as proxy to size of enterprises. 
2) Log K/L, State aid and control variables are assumed endogenous and instrumented by lags (starting from the third lag). 
 
Due to the fact that higher capital/labor ratio is usually associated with more advanced technology, it could be expected that 
state aid 2 leads to the increase in TFP, which is indeed the case, according to our previous calculations. It should be noted 
that its is quite an expected result, since the first type of state aid (provided to enterprises being in financial distress), both 
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due to its specifics, and relatively insignificant size (mean value of first type state aid in relative terms is only 45% of the 
second type of state aid) as a rule is not used to finance restructuring, but for replenishment of the working capital and for 
wage payments for employees.16  In addition, this result was the consequence of the pursued industrial policy: the second 
type of state aid has been provided to the large-size and largest enterprises which are the leaders of the Belarusian 
industry. It should be noted that the directions of spending of aid funds were strictly specified and controlled. Although civil 
servants are not the best managers and that is why not all projects became success stories17, on the average, the pursued 
policy for provision of the second type of state aid has yielded positive results. 
6. Conclusions 
 
Table 9 summarizes the results of my findings. It appears that there is a good deal of difference between state aid 1 and 
state aid 2.  
 
 
 
Table.  9. Summary. Impact of State Aid 1 and 2 on TFP, K/L Ratio, Employment, Market Share and Allocative 
Efficiency 
Impact of state aid on performance 
indicators 
Impact of state aid 1 Impact of state aid 2 
TFP  
-Whole sample  Negative Positive 
-Enterprises, receiving aid Insignificant Strongly positive 
-Small Negative No observations 
-Medium Insignificant Positive 
 -Large  Negative Strongly positive 
                            
16 Until December 2008,  indicators for the average wage growth for the future year were set in Belarus irrespective of the form of 
ownership of the enterprises, and they were  mandatory. 
17 So, despite the significant size of state aid, the State-Owned company “Horizont”  producing television sets failed to compete in the 
market successfully. 
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K/L ratio  
-Enterprises, receiving aid Insignificant  Positive 
-Medium Insignificant Mildly positive 
 -Large  Insignificant  Strongly positive 
Employment  
-Whole sample  Insignificant  Insignificant 
-Enterprises, receiving aid Positive Positive 
-Small Insignificant  No observations 
-Medium Insignificant Insignificant 
 -Large  Positive Insignificant 
Market share 
-Whole sample  Insignificant  Insignificant 
- Enterprises, receiving aid Insignificant Insignificant 
-Small Insignificant No observations 
-Medium Insignificant Insignificant 
 -Large  Mildly positive Positive  
Allocative efficiency 
-Whole sample  Insignificant Positive 
- Enterprises, receiving aid Insignificant Insignificant 
-Small Positive No observations 
-Medium Insignificant Insignificant 
 -Large  Mildly negative Positive 
 
The state aid of the second type (that is provided for restructuring) is quite efficient in a sense that it affects positively the 
growth of K/L ratio in the following year, TFP growth, employment (only for large firms), market share (again for large 
enterprises only) and allocative efficiency. The story consistent with the data is that state aid 2 really leads to the 
modernization of the enterprises (K/L ratio grows) and that this modernization leads to the increase in efficiency (TFP grows 
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especially at large enterprises), and that this growth of TFP allows these newly restructured enterprises to increase their 
market share which results in the growth of the allocative efficiency.   
On the contrary, state aid of the first type (that is provided to support enterprises in financial distress) cannot be considered 
efficient. It leads to the increase in employment (only for enterprises receiving aid, especially for large enterprises, but not 
for the total sample) and to the increase in the market share of large enterprises (not small and medium size), but this 
achievement comes at the expense of the decrease in TFP.  
 
 
Appendices   
 
Table1. State Aid   for Industrial Enterprises in Belarus as Percent of Total Output 
 
 
 
Total aid  Aid 1 Aid 2 
1998 4.10 1.72 2.38 
1999 5.03 2.01 3.02 
2000 4.84 1.84 3.00 
2001 4.94 2.32 2.62 
2002 5.15 2.27 2.89 
2003 5.76 2.13 3.63 
2004 5.01 2.11 2.91 
2005 4.39 1.76 2.63 
2006 3.57 1.61 1.96 
2007 3.71 1.45 2.26 
Weighted  average over period  5.01 2.07 2.94 
Old EU members on average 
(excluding agriculture and transport)  
0.4   
New EU members on average 1.2   
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Table 2 .  Summary Statistics on Aid for Enterprises receiving Aid 
.  
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid to sale ratio 
(percent) 
     
aid 1 3,934 3.90 2.09 0.51 14.88 
aid 2 2,605 8.65 5.21 1.17 24.01 
Amount of aid in 
rubles (1998) 
     
aid 1 3,934 98,477.83 314,444.50 1.20 11,035,100 
aid 2 2,605 201,092.60 781,525.20 39.38 142,000,456 
 
 
Table 3 .  Structure of sample by ownership type, % 
 
 1998 2007 
State enterprises  49.15 47.11 
Mainly state  4.58 14.45 
Mainly private  20.40 15.94 
private  13.15 15.96 
Joint Venture  10.15 5.40 
Foreign 
enterprises  
1.95 1.66 
Total number of 
enterprises  
2,358 2,112 
 
 
 
 
 34
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Firm-level summary statistics, billion BYR 1998, labor in units 
 
.  
                                                                       Employment 
Industrial 
Sector 
NACE 1.1 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mining of 
coal and 
lignite 10 272 183,94 97,90 4 450 
Other mining 
(stone, sand, 
etc. 14 137 1 322,77 3 965,29 10 18 131 
Foods and 
beverages 15 4 247 216,58 266,79 2 2 903 
Tobacco 
products 17 862 568,50 1 062,33 7 7 287 
Textiles 18 1 020 312,65 413,90 5 2 332 
Apparel 19 330 519,52 488,37 4 2 434 
Leather 20 1 683 192,48 330,74 2 3 810 
Wood and 
wood 
products   21 139 595,12 675,27 18 2 888 
Paper 22 502 114,91 202,40 3 1 312 
Publishing 23 32 2 497,06 1 769,04 58 5 716 
Coke, 
petroleum 
products 24 352 1 203,92 2 614,40 5 17 750 
Chemicals 25 299 570,60 1 876,29 2 13 392 
Rubber and 
plastics 26 1 077 405,97 684,19 7 4 530 
Other non-
metals 27 128 1 223,16 2 689,69 6 12 195 
Basic 
metals 28 640 281,00 343,29 2 1 935 
Metal 
products 29 969 989,85 2 047,67 5 19 762 
Machinery 30 43 1 079,53 1 374,63 10 5 044 
Office 
equipment 31 408 625,32 849,19 6 4 676 
Electrical 
equipment 32 232 954,28 1 132,40 6 5 950 
TV and 
Radio Sets, 
and 33 222 600,31 854,80 2 4 853 
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equipment 
Precision 
instruments 34 286 1 624,44 3 587,94 3 23 410 
Motor 
vehicles 35 76 611,07 1 084,14 36 3 975 
Other 
transport  
equipment 36 903 393,30 775,55 2 6 651 
Furniture 37 77 221,26 136,60 29 531 
Repair of 
computers 
and others   94 438 274,27 496,15 3 3 134 
Total               19 218 433,36 1 142,29 2 23 410 
                                                                                 Capital 
Industrial 
Sector 
NACE 1.1 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mining of 
coal and 
lignite 10 272 1 491 909 6 235 045,40 1 749,38 47 200 000 
Other mining 
(stone, sand, 
etc. 14 137 4 440 854 16 210 935,00 2 176,47 78 700 000 
Foods and 
beverages 15 4 237 454 332 5 337 702,50 0,00 1 134 000  
Tobacco 
products 17 862 324 261 764 071,31 59,84 5 902 470 
Textiles 18 1 020 67 845 131 853,90 15,13 1 169 743 
Apparel 19 327 637 729 1 097 556,00 30,30 5 887 358 
Leather 20 1 680 370 760 4 851 936,80 20,08 182 000  
Wood and 
wood 
products   21 138 341 826 373 457,38 144,56 1 456 163 
Paper 22 502 68 488 195 846,57 192,29 1 676 383 
Publishing 23 32 14 000 000 9 950 558,70 33 003,40 29 300 000 
Coke, 
Petroleum 
Products 24 352 3 542 530 9 327 958,20 508,24 55 900 000 
Chemicals 25 299 1 472 436 6 520 206,40 179,20 43 200 000 
Rubber and 
plastics 26 1 075 731 552 2 880 607,40 60,05 36 200 000 
Other non-
metals 27 128 5 369 664 15 791 489,00 52,00 75 900 000 
Basic 
metals 28 640 225 143 304 841,42 28,88 1 817 160 
Metal 
products 29 969 1 059 276 2 264 831,00 57,75 21 800 000 
Machinery 30 43 1 472 586 2 425 493,70 450,00 7 201 592 
Office 
equipment 31 408 575 658 804 697,18 1 017,40 3 666 155 
Electrical 
equipment 32 232 966 727 1 318 166,70 984,00 6 630 846 
TV and 
Radio Sets, 33 222 410 796 639 301,00 746,65 2 790 752 
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and 
equipment 
Precision 
instruments 34 286 1 345 535 3 459 375,10 38,08 31 900 000 
Motor 
vehicles 35 76 624 195 979 978,36 12 419,46 3 778 677 
Other 
transport  
equipment 36 903 253 512 671 575,57 20,08 5 423 623 
Furniture 37 77 531 869 486 895,79 1 400,00 1 972 306 
Repair of 
computers 
and others   94 438 131 822 303 291,00 44,11 1 825 928 
Total  
  
19 218 673 778 4 562 270,40                  2.89   78 700 000 
                                                           Output 
Industrial 
Sector 
NACE 1.1 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mining of 
coal and 
lignite 10 264 78 783,63 101 640 725,22 797 780 
Other mining 
(stone, sand, 
etc. 14 134 1 821 580,00 6 881 109 77,33 36 800 000 
Foods and 
beverages 15 4 237 401 605,90 1 489 964 0,00 33 100 000 
Tobacco 
products 17 862 312 378,50 764 897 119,30 14 100 000 
Textiles 18 1 020 559 497,30 2 067 579 0,00 31 400 000 
Apparel 19 330 1 008 485,00 3 912 712 2 052,77 32 800 000 
Leather 20 1 682 303 711,20 2 329 213 0,00 80 600 000 
Wood and 
wood 
products   21 138 603 002,30 917 010 708,53 3 585 746 
Paper 22 502 1 193 696,00 7 658 540 179,49 71 200 000 
Publishing 23 32 1 092 987,00 1 552 343 937,68 3 830 773 
Coke, 
Petroleum 
Products 24 352 1 180 175,00 3 314 826 0,00 22 500 000 
Chemicals 25 299 335 053,10 664 136 0,00 4 278 521 
Rubber and 
plastics 26 1 067 960 665,00 7 985 629 302,92 106 323 000 
Other non-
metals 27 121 715 367,30 1 702 816 1 770,25 8 615 702 
Basic 
metals 28 640 380 058,40 948 361 2,90 11 700 000 
Metal 
products 29 969 1 693 273,00 6 527 747 0,00 67 800 000 
Machinery 30 43 1 000 135,00 1 646 866 307,85 5 950 872 
Office 
equipment 31 408 430 593,70 842 735 359,87 6 211 555 
Electrical 
equipment 32 232 488 319,10 909 827 822,47 5 330 894 
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TV and 
Radio Sets, 
and 
equipment 33 222 300 391,70 402 475 789,85 1 850 804 
Precision 
instruments 34 286 1 467 674,00 4 699 154 1 002,00 34 100 000 
Motor 
vehicles 35 76 462 357,40 1 186 710 2 527,07 4 727 916 
Other 
transport  
equipment 36 900 279 358,50 778 901 0,00 7 946 856 
Furniture 37 77 380 424,60 426 107 3 911,75 1 433 927 
Repair of 
computers 
and others   94 432 287 150,00 594 898 461,63 4 995 288 
Total  
  
19 218 596 218,82 3 511 353 2.9              106 323 000 
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